Book Review: People Under Siege: The Unionists of Northern Ireland, from Partition to Brexit and Beyond, by Aaron Edwards (2023)

edwards-v2-2-820x1211-1Can Ulster Unionism be reformed? And, if so, into what? These are the central questions posed in Aaron Edwards’ book: at one point, he draws a distinction between ‘Ulster British’ (inclusive, tolerant, good) and ‘Ulster Loyalist’ (not so much), and elsewhere with ‘civic Unionism’ against ‘cultural Loyalism’ (likewise respectively). When confronted with the choice between these two worldviews, however, it is rarely the angels of Unionism’s better nature that wins out, as the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) found when it tried to harness the strength of one in the service of the other.

It might not have been the most obvious party of peacemakers, formed as it was by members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) while they were serving prison sentences for various terrorist offences. Yet enforced confinement does hold certain advantages; for one, the time to think and take stock of circumstances.

“In the compounds we had these regular seminars,” explained Billy Mitchell, the UVF Director of Operations:

There would have been differences of opinion. There were people still locked in what we would call a ‘DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] mindset’. Others were more progressive in their thinking. And, so, there was this melting pot of ideas and thoughts.

Out of this stew came:

…a consensus that we had to redefine unionism. One, we had to understand what unionism was all about. A lot of volunteers were responding to republican violence…So, none of us went into Long Kesh with an ideology. It was in Long Kesh that we hammered it out.

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Billy Mitchell

The creed so forged was, as Edwards describes, a “liberal, left-leaning and working-class alternative to mainstream unionism.” This made it a perfect fit for the PUP, looking as it was to challenge shibboleths in their community. While others railed against the Good Friday Agreement as a betrayal, Mitchell, as the PUP’s senior strategist, saw it representing a “transition, of invitation and of opportunity,” and the chance at “a new era of hope and opportunity.” Unfortunately, the tide of Unionist public opinion was not flowing in his favour, as shown when Billy Hutchinson, his PUP colleague and fellow ex-prisoner, lost his seat in the Northern Irish Assembly in 2003 and later his council seat as well.

Things took another turn for the hard-line with the Flag Protests, when Belfast City Council voted in December 2012 to limit the flying of the Union Jack over its buildings to designated days. Enraged at what they saw as a devious Fenian plot, protestors descended on Belfast City Hall to disrupt the vote, some even succeeding at breaking through the security barriers and into the building before police could intervene. Present at these demonstrations was Hutchison, ruminating to reporters at an impromptu press conference about the ‘de-Britification’ that he said was taking place.

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Flag Protestors outside Belfast City Hall

Yet, a decade earlier, the PUP had sounded positively agnostic on the whole question if the statements of Mitchell were anything to go by. He dismissed “Sinn Féin’s preoccupation with flags and emblems” as having “more to do with wanting to remove any visible sign of their failure to break the link with Britain than it has to do with republican ideals.” Even if successful, such cultural coups were “nothing for nationalists to be jubilant about or for unionists to be despondent about.” Fine words, perhaps, but, by 2012, there was plenty of despondency to go about as far as many of the latter were concerned. “The protests are not about the flag, they never were just about the flag,” wrote one editor of a Shankhill-based newspaper. “There is a deep-rooted disillusionment within PUL [Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist] working-class communities that they have been left behind by those in power at Stormont.”

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Julie-Anne Corr-Johnston (Source: https://belfastcity.public-i.tv/core/portal/speaker_profile/24486

It was a vacuum the PUP moved to fill, and successfully so – at first – winning over 12,000 first preference votes in the 2014 local government elections, with four councillors elected in Belfast and Coleraine, and an influx of new members, albeit many being more in tune with ‘The Sash’ than ‘The Internationale’, in Edwards’ pithy phase. In doing so, the party envisioned as the working-class alternative to mainstream Unionism seemed to have lost its way, in the view of members like Julie-Anne Corr-Johnston.

“More and more people came to join the party,” she recalls:

They were very much disillusioned with the DUP and a lot of it was protest. Some came from the TUV [Traditional Unionist Voice]. And they didn’t join the party because of its policies, because of its vision for it. They joined it because of its reaction to certain events and thought it would give them strength in numbers.

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Billy Hutchinson (Source: https://minutes3.belfastcity.gov.uk/mgUserInfo.aspx?UID=42)

Numbers soon became what the PUP lacked, securing only 5,955 first preference votes two years after its bounce, in the 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly elections and failing to grow its electoral profile. The DUP and TUV, in contrast, saw the return of their natural voters, while the ‘squeezed middle’ demographic passed over the PUP in favour of the Green Party and the People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA). In attempting to weave divergent strands together – ‘civic Unionism’ with ‘cultural Loyalism’ – the PUP had been left merely with frayed edges.

It’s a contrast – and contradiction – that Edwards is well placed to navigate for his readers. The book begins and end with him on the Glorious Twelfth, in 2001 and 2021 respectively, taking in the sight of that most contentious of events: an Orange parade. On neither occasion did things run smoothly. In 2001, on Whitewell Road, North Belfast, a line of police Land Rovers blocked the way, while a Nationalist crowd on the other side hurled bricks, bottles and even golf balls at the thirty Orangemen making an attempt at a parade.

Twenty years later, in 2021, it was the lockdown thanks to the Coronavirus that stymied the big event, though the Eleventh Night bonfires Edwards beheld in Ballymoney, Co. Antrim, made up for the lack of spectacle. These bonfires, Edwards notes, had become much larger and grander than the ones to be found two decades ago, the acrid stink of burnt pallets and melted tyres enough to make him gag while just passing by. “A perfect metaphor for the wrecking of working-class areas,” he muses, while before, in 2001, what had moved him was the plight of the parade participants, thwarted by police and assailed with missiles.

Despite the book’s title, and the frequent depictions by the media of Unionists having a siege mentality, Nationalists, Republicans and what-have-you rarely feature here; the big struggle, instead, being Unionism’s against itself. For all the modern veneration of icons like Edward Carson and James Craig (whose stern, moustached visage adorns the wall mural of an otherwise plain-looking house in one photo), the Northern Irish state, from its inception in the early 1920s, was never entirely confident of the support of the people it had supposedly been created for.

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Wall mural of James Craig, founding father of Northern Ireland

Aspiring politicians standing on a platform of Independent Unionist such as Tommy Henderson or Labour like Harry Midgley threatened to chip away at the hegemony of the Unionist Party. Class was (and, it seems, remains to this day) a major fault line: Henderson worked as a housepainter, while his opponent for the parliamentary seat of North Belfast in 1923, Thomas McConnell, was the managing director of a cattle and horse-trading business. McConnell won, but with a reduced majority. Midgley likewise cut into the establishment man’s majority for West Belfast during the same general election – worse, he had done so by taking almost as many Protestant votes (10,000) as Catholic ones (12,000). Little wonder, then, that Carson sounded close to panic at the next Westminster election a year later, in 1924, when he warned crowds in North Belfast that they were “facing Ulster’s most crucial hour,” with any split on the Unionist vote likely to open the door to a Sinn Féin victory.

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Tommy Henderson

Despite such challenges and close shaves, Northern Ireland would remain as it was, made in the sectarian, conservative and heavy-handed image its founding fathers had intended. Nonetheless, hope for a difference remained. Henderson’s next run at a constituency seat, a decade later in 1933, was much more successful, thanks to an artfully choreographed performance which had him arriving on the Shankhill Road on the back of a flat-bed lorry, before speaking from an illuminated pedestal. Notably, his choice of talking points were bread-and-butter ones, easily relatable to his listeners, and it earned Henderson a seat in the Northern Ireland House of Commons.

It is in such grassroots figures, Edwards suggests, that the hope of Unionism – ‘civic Unionism’ over ‘cultural Loyalism’ – lies. This reviewer confesses himself sceptical, despite the book’s best efforts. As of now, the DUP remains the party of choice for the Unionist voter, and even a maverick like Henderson took care to play his own Orange card, emphasising how “his Unionism and his Protestantism were as good” as anyone’s – a lesson anyone seeking to breach the siege mentality of Unionism had best remember.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

See also:

Book Review: My Life in Loyalism, by Billy Hutchinson (with Gareth Mulvenna) (2020)

Book Review: UVF: Behind the Mask, by Aaron Edwards (2017)

Book Review: Ireland’s Special Branch: The Inside Story of their Battle with the IRA, 1922-1947, by Gerard Lovett (2022)

Special Branch book coverAnyone believing the Civil War was over in Ireland by 1926 might have reconsidered that viewpoint when, on the 14th November, twelve stations of the Garda Síochána came under coordinated attack by members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The goal was to steal, not to kill; nonetheless, two Gardaí were dead by the end.

The orderly who answered the knock at St Luke’s station in Cork city managed to strike the revolver away from the man in front of him and slam the door back shut, but the bullets passed through the barrier all the same and killed Sergeant James Fitzsimons. At Hollyford station, Co. Tipperary, Garda Hugh Ward did not even get that chance, being shot at point blank range as soon as he opened the door. Ward lingered in hospital for two days before dying. Police personnel in other stations were luckier, being merely held up at gunpoint while the intruders seized whatever cash, equipment and paper records they could.

Such brazen assaults on the custodians of the law were hardly new in Ireland and would not be for the last time. A year later, almost to the day, on the 20th November 1927, Crumlin station in Dublin fell victim to the same trick: a rap one night brought Garda Thomas Doyle close enough for the bullets, fired without warning, to pierce the door and wound him. Doyle would survive, as would the integrity of the station, thanks to one of his colleagues, Murphy, shooting back with a revolver to drive off the raiders.

Significantly, the gun had not been Murphy’s own, having been left behind in a drawer by one of the Special Branch: the Garda generally went unarmed, adding to the sense of outrage as author Gerald Lovett puts it:

The deaths of Fitzsimons and Ward were the last straw for a force that since its foundation endured continuous threats and intimidation and suffered eight fatalities in their years of existence. They considered it a particularly cowardly act to shoot down two unarmed, uniformed gardaí who had no involvement in the ongoing battle against the IRA.

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Eoin O’Duffy

Rubbing salt into the collective wound was how “most of the new force consisted of former pro-Treaty IRA men” from the Civil War. Retribution could be fierce: Republican prisoners were beaten in their cells after taunts about Fitzsimons and Ward. In the resulting public outcry, the Government wanted the policemen responsible fired, only for Eoin O’Duffy to threaten his resignation as Garda Commissioner. A compromise was reached: the culprits kept their jobs in return for paying a portion of the damages to their victims.

Wash, rinse, repeat: political subversion provoked heavy-handed responses, followed by dithering on the part of the authorities over whether to uphold their own laws or to stand by the men they relied on. Damages for assault and false imprisonment of suspects against Special Branch individuals, during a particularly heated period between 1929 and 1931, were paid for by the State. But the IRA did more than issue lawsuits.

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Superintendent John Curtin

Superintendent John Curtin was opening the gates to his Tipperary house one evening in March 1931 when gunmen, who had been lying in wait, opened fire, close enough to leave scorch marks on his clothes as well as five bullets in his body, fatally so. As the head Special Branch officer in the county, Curtin had overseen many arrests to match the surge in IRA recruitment. However enthusiastic he may have been in pursuit of his duties, Curtin’s rough methods arguably did more harm than benefit to his cases. One witness to four men charged with illegal drilling retracted his statement to the court, saying it had been made under duress after Curtin “knocked [him] about a bit” and threatened to “paste me against the wall.” The four accused were acquitted by the jury and discharged.

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Frank Ryan

Republicans gloated at Curtin’s murder. A poster issued by Cumann na mBan hailed “the men of Tipperary, true to the traditions of their forefathers” who “have shown that they will not allow a Free State superintendent to stand between them and freedom.” The deceased, IRA spokesman Frank Ryan (and later guest of the Third Reich) explained in a newspaper interview in August 1931, five months later, “had exceeded his duty. He went out of his way to persecute the IRA.” Ryan was happy to draw a distinction between the bulk of Garda Síochána, confining itself as it did to regular police work, and the overtly political Special Branch, who “if they ask for trouble…must not be surprised if they get it.”

He was blunter in regards to John Ryan (no relation), a co-operator in one of Curtin’s cases, who was shot dead on a roadside in July 1931. “He was nothing but a traitor,” Frank Ryan sneered. ‘Spies and Informers beware. IRA,’ had read the note left by the body.IRA spy sign

It was a scene straight out of the War of Independence. But then, for some, the Irish revolution had never ended. Perhaps the Civil War had been too bitter and too savage for bygones to ever truly be bygones. “We cannot make omelettes without breaking the eggs,” Kevin O’Higgins told the Dáil in March 1923. “We cannot build up a disciplined and self-respecting decent country without hitting pretty hard a head here and there.” He might well have had the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in mind. Formed almost at the start of the internecine conflict in August 1922, the CID soon earned a dark reputation from their Republican targets such as Todd Andrews, due to their methods of:

…torturing prisoners under interrogation, which is to say, they were beaten and battered sometimes into a state of unconsciousness.

And these wretches could be considered fortunate since other:

Republican activities, real or suspected, were picked up on the streets and never got as far as Oriel House [the base of the CID]. They were shot out of hand.

Whatever else may be said about the CID, its tactics worked, enough for the Freeman’s Journal, upon the CID’s disbandment in October 1923, to print its concerns at the loss of such an effective tool. After all:

It is questionable if any force organised for the prevention and detection of crime has established so fine a record in so short a time. At the time they were formed most people had almost given up hope that an effective means would be found of stamping out the epidemic of armed robbery in Dublin. Inside a few weeks the CID had the bandits on the defensive, and ever since it has been keeping them on the run.

A very different picture, then, than the one Andrews painted. The newspaper need not have worried too much, for the most energetic (and more presentable) CID men were transferred to the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) (the rest were dropped, possibly, as Lovett speculates, because they matched Andrews’ brutal depiction of them a little too well). When the DMP was amalgamated in turn with the Garda Síochána in 1925, and the Special Branch formed, the new force was ready to confront an IRA that was as determined as the State to be going nowhere.

Lovett generally eschews analysis or commentary in his text, letting the story be told through the various listings of arrests and reprisals, shootings and beatings, police successes and official reversals. Despite having served as a detective inspector in the Garda Special Branch (retiring in 2004, according to the book jacket), the author remains admirably neutral, making it plain that both sides could be prone to violence as the solution to a problem.

And what violence there was! Ireland in the post-Civil War years seems to have resembled a Paul Williams gangland read, except the outlaws here were primarily concerned with targeting the State rather than each other (with exceptions – spies and informers beware, indeed). Contrary to the subtitle, the men of the Special Branch are only sometimes the central characters; the whole policing and legal apparatus is given considerable airing in the State struggle against the IRA – which, for its part, threatens at times to dominate the book as it almost did the country.

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Assistant Commissioner Michael Finn playing a wreath on the site of John Curtin’s murder, March 2022 (source: https://www.tipperarylive.ie/news/home/779056/big-read-victim-of-ira-1931-ambush-in-tipperary-town-commemorated.html)

Trouble worked its way up to the top: Tomás Mac Curtain was spared the death penalty for gunning down Detective Garda John Roche in January 1940. This reprieve was due – according to one source, anyway – to several Fianna Fáil TDs threatening to resign their seats and thus deprive the Government of its majority. Residue sympathy for Mac Curtain’s father, the murdered Mayor of Cork, was presumably at play, as well as how the TDs in question were formerly members of the IRA. But then, so had been Superintendent Curtin, along with many of his Special Branch and Garda colleagues, to say nothing of the other TDs in the Dáil. If this book suffers in its focus, it does compensate by capturing the wider picture of a most turbulent time in Ireland.

Publisher’s Website: Eastwood Books

Originally published in The Irish Story (20/12/2022)

Book Review: Soldiers of Liberty: A Study of Fenianism, 1858 – 1908, by Eva Ó Cathaoir (2018)

“There is no time to be lost,” Pierce Nagle told a covert meeting of Fenian officers in Tipperary, in September 1864, as he read out a call for action from their leader, James Stephens:

This year – and let there be no doubt about it – must be the year of action. I speak with a knowledge and an authority to which no man could pretend, and I repeat, the flag of Ireland – of the Irish Republic – must this year be raised. As I am much pressed for time, I shall merely add that it shall be raised in flow of hope such as never beamed around it before. Be, then, of firm faith and best cheer; all goes bravely on.

Stirring words, but his audience might have been more cautious if they had known that Nagle had purloined the letter while its courier was passed out drunk. Further cause for alarm was how Nagle, their supposed comrade in the fight for Irish freedom, was a police informant. Instead of burning the incriminating message immediately after, Nagle passed it on to his paymasters in Dublin Castle, who were already concerned at reports from across Ireland of illicit drills, unruly crowds and mutinous murmurings.

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A Fenian flag from 1867, more information here: https://www.fotw.info/flags/ie_fenwc.html

Nagle was not the only inside source: a former militia sergeant who had switched to the Fenians in Cork turned his coat again and told a magistrate that his comrades were planning to storm police barracks, steal its weapons and burn the local bishop in tar for his opposition to them. Cork, in particular, was identified by the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Wodehouse, as a hotspot for sedition, as “the feeling in favour of it amongst the small shopkeepers and the young farmers is strong,” he told the home secretary. And not just Cork: “Parts of Kerry, Tipperary and Kilkenny are also affected with a very disloyal spirit.”

But then, the Powers That Be hardly needed traitors and espionage to know that dissent was in the air, thanks to the radical press. ‘The approaching crisis,’ went one headline in the Irish People, and while the topic was ostensibly about potential revolutions elsewhere, in Europe, only an ingénue could fail to see the parallels the newspaper was drawing closer to home. Nonetheless, Dublin Castle hesitated to act for fear of intruding on the sanctity of freedom of speech, long a cornerstone of the British state.

“Press prosecutions are always odious,” admitted Lord Wodehouse, even as he railed against “openly treasonous” material that was being “distributed broadcast through the country and eagerly read by the shopkeepers and peasants.” What’s more, “the office [of the Irish People] is the headquarters of the conspirators.”

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James Stephens

Which was why, when it was time to make the mass arrests of Fenian suspects in Dublin and Cork, the office in question was among the places on the police target list. After detaining everyone on the premises and smashing the newspaper’s type, the constabulary would seize and destroy copies of the final issue, for the 16th September 1865, wherever they could be found in the country. Having escaped the initial roundup, Stephens remained at large until his arrest two months later, in November, though neither this setback nor the subsequent legal proceedings dampened his revolutionary ardour. If anything, he seemed to relish the challenge.

“I defy and despise any punishment it can inflict on me,” he told the court, setting a precedent for future generations of Irish Republicans in his refusal to recognise it. “I have spoken.”

Stephens had a presence to match his words. While physically unimpressive in the eyes of a reporter from the London Times – “rather below the middle stature…the front and top [of his head] being entirely bald” – this same onlooker could not help regarding the prisoner with something close to awe:

His manners are gentlemanly, saving a certain abruptness and impatience. He was, however, apparently very much at ease during the day, not at all like a prisoner charged with a great crime, but rather like an attorney watching a case, with a full consciousness of his own superior ability and the goodness of his cause, with sovereign contempt for ‘the other side’.

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Charles Kickham

Not many journalists today would write with such gusto. But then, this was a society very much engaged with the written word, from the Fenians’ use of the Irish People as a propaganda tool to the literary ambitions of one of Stephens’ co-defendants, Charles Kickham, whose novel, Sally Cavanagh, had been serialised the year before, in 1864.The title character is forced to endure the unwanted attentions of the landlord when her husband emigrates for want of wages. Sally, of course, resists, as is only proper for a virtuous wife and the stand-in for the Irish nation, leading to one tragedy after another: sent to the workhouse, her children dying in poverty and, finally, going mad just before Mr Cavanagh is able to return with money.

If the melodrama sounds a bit much for modern tastes and its allegory clankingly obvious, then many of Kirkham’s contemporaries would have seen much to relate to in Sally Cavanagh’s plight. The Famine, after all, had been less than three decades ago, when, instead of the expected harvest in 1845, “the air was laden with a sickly odour of death, as if the hand of death had stricken the potato field, and that everything growing in it was rotting.”

So remembered Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, later a man whose funeral became one of the great set-pieces of Irish history, but then a fifteen-year-old boy who had helped bury a starved woman – his poem ‘Jillen Andy’ was written in her memory. Like many other survivors, Rossa blamed the disaster on Perfidious Albion and, while the author Eva Ó Cathaoir notes that the reality was a good deal more complex, with fingers also to be pointed at the realities of human nature – Rossa himself noted how his wealthy relatives refused to assist the rest of the family – the memories of the countrywide death and degradation lived on, fuelling future attempts to shake off the Saxon yoke.

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Illustrated depiction of the Great Famine

The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) was one such enterprise. Stephens took its oath upon its establishment in Dublin, March 1858, and wasted no time in setting off across Ireland, establishing contacts and setting up cell-like ‘Circles’. Many were the IRB’s tactics employed in its goal of an independent nation: infiltrating British forces stationed in Ireland seemed a promising option – after all, 40% of such soldiers were Irish-born, compared to a third of the United Kingdom’s total population – as well as facilitating an invasion/reinforcement of Irish-Americans, recruited from Civil War veterans. Such attempts were considered threatening enough by the authorities to take stern measures, arresting suspected Fenian operatives and putting the Royal Navy on the alert for any Trans-Atlantic incursions.

Nothing came of any of these schemes and perhaps nothing would have even in better circumstances. But the defeat of the Fenians, time and time again, did nothing to stop Fenianism permeating Irish society as a whole – quite the contrary, if anything – as Ó Cathaoir meticulously outlines to her reader.

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Memorial cabinet card for Charles McCarthy

Charles McCarthy’s death in 1878, shortly after his thirteen years in prison (being one of the British soldiers covertly sworn into the IRB), allowed public sympathy to turn his funeral into a nationalist demonstration. Fifteen thousand people were reported to have paid their respects on one day alone; this despite his body being barred from church grounds on account of the hostility of Cardinal Paul Cullen to whom Fenianism was “a compound of folly and wickedness wearing the mask of patriotism.” But even Hierarchy apathy was not unanimous. While raising funds for the remaining political prisoners, Archbishop Thomas Croke argued that the likes of McCarthy were worthy not just of sympathy but admiration.

For all “the freaks and infidelity of a few amongst them,” Croke told a disapproving Cullen, “I cannot agree with your eminence that the Fenians have effected no good. They have given us a tolerable land bill and disestablished the Protestant church.”

Not directly, of course; William Gladstone could claim the most credit for the aforementioned, having taken office in 1868 with the intent of solving, or at least mollifying, the problems that had long poisoned Anglo-Irish relations. When the town commissioners of Nenagh proposed a vote of confidence in the Prime Minster, Peter Gill, a radical journalist, remonstrated. Surely the town worthies should thank the Fenians instead, whose actions, however unsuccessful, had drawn Gladstone’s reforming attentions in the first place?

Whether feared or loved, scorned or praised, hopeless failures or moral victors, the Fenians could never be ignored, either by contemporaries or those seeking to understand how Ireland got to be the way it is – and the latter would do well to start here with this engrossing book.

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Publisher’s Website: The Lilliput Press

 

Book Review: UVF: Behind the Mask, by Aaron Edwards (2017)

51l29jvlhvl._sx342_sy445_ql70_ml2_Never let it be said that the East Antrim unit of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) could not be equal opportunity killers when opportunity or need arose, as two men learned the hard way when abducted on the 7th April 1975, in North Belfast. Hugh McVeigh and David Douglas had stopped their delivery van in Newington Avenue, inadvertently giving the armed occupants of the cab tailing them the chance to step out at the same time as they did and waylay them. The captives were driven out of the city in another vehicle, to a lonely stretch of the Antrim coast where they were found five months later, buried together in a shallow grave, one on top of the other, with hands bound behind their backs and bullet holes in their heads.

Appearances aside, the executions had not exactly been a flawless process. According to one participant who confessed his culpability to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), when a kneeling Douglas was shot, the gunman narrowly missed one of his accomplices, causing the latter to lose his balance and fall over. To add to the confusion, a couple of the group panicked and fled, for all the good it did McVeigh, who was shot next and then again, as was Douglas, presumably to be sure.

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Hugh McVeigh (left) and David Douglas (right)

However shocking, such ruthlessness was the UVF’s raison d’etre, as a Brigade Officer, Billy Mitchell, who had been present at the double homicide, explained:

The UVF was…formed because they believed there was a sell-out, there was a rebellion which had to be stopped, whether you were from the Shankhill or East Antrim you had one enemy – the IRA [Irish Republican Army], indeed the nationalist community, as most UVF volunteers didn’t distinguish between the IRA and those they fought for.

It would seem that Loyalists did not always distinguish between themselves either, as both McVeigh and Douglas were, in theory, on the same side as their killers, albeit as part of a separate paramilitary organisation, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). But in Northern Ireland, differences, not similarities, were what mattered – and arguably still do – not to mention, perhaps most of all, power:

In many cases the focus was territory, there would not have been any philosophical differences between the two organisations there would have been issues around personalities, feelings in both sides that ‘we are the elite’.

Tellingly, Mitchell expressed the feud in military terms – “regimental loyalty was the key factor in competitiveness – not unlike the regular British Army” – a sign of how he and his UVF colleagues saw themselves as the Thin Orange Line holding back the Fenian fuzzie-wuzzies. It is doubtful, however, if even the most competitive of regiments in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces would have gone so far as to attack each other’s drinking clubs, as the UVF did to a UDA-linked shebeen, driving up in a small collection of black cabs and armed with iron bars wrapped in newspaper, which they used to trash the place in return for the beating of one of their members.

plate35The UVF assailants returned to their pints at their own bar, only to be invaded in turn later that day by a UDA revenge party, numbering hundreds in a purloined flotilla of their own which included cars, taxis, buses and even a tractor. The UVF ringleader responsible for the earlier vandalism was beaten within an inch of his life, another act of war in a feud that was to culminate in the murders of McVeigh and Douglas. Given the Loyalist willingness to inflict grievous bodily harm against their own, it is not surprising that at least one of the men arrested for the double homicide appeared more scared of being killed in jail than the prospect of jail itself.

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Terence O’Neill

Even from the start, the UVF was as much driven by suspicion of the Unionist Enemy Within as the Nationalist Enemy Without. The men who gathered at a farm at Pomeroy, Co. Tyrone, in November 1965 – during an insufferably clichéd dark and stormy night – may have done so for fear of a resurgent IRA; the 50th anniversary of the 1916 Rising was only a year away, after all. But had the premiership of Terence O’Neill been more vigilant or sufficiently hard-line, there would be no need, in the minds of the UVF founding fathers, for them to take their current course of action, standing side by side inside a dimly-lit barn with their right hands raised as they were sworn into a reborn UVF.

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Gusty Spence

One of these inductees, Augustus ‘Gusty’ Spence, had had prior experience in counter-insurgency as part of the Royal Ulster Rifles in Cyprus in the 1950s. That background was presumably why he had been asked to join the UVF by two men, one of whom was a Unionist Party politician. At least, this is according to Spence, who neglected to provide a name, but the idea of the UVF as something more than an expression of working-class Unionist discontent can be found elsewhere: the RUC Crime Special Department suspected a number of grandees in the Northern Irish state of links with Loyalist paramilitaries, an alleged alliance by the top and bottom of Unionism against the conciliatory policies of an offensively liberal O’Neill.

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UVF member

But, like much about the period, speculations are common, certainty less so. As Aaron Edwards puts it:

Some of the oral history contributions collected for this book have been difficult to verify in the absence of written evidence, so it would be wrong to speculate. However, it appears that the archival record has been completely expunged of this suspected high-level conspiracy, which is suspicious for, even if it was an invention of the men subsequently arrested and prosecuted, it is reasonable to assume that the RUC would have intelligence (in the absence of evidence) either proving or disproving its existence, yet no paper trail exists.

Well, who knows? It is hard to prove a negative, after all. However they began, the likes of Gusty Spence would need no further prodding from above to take up the gun for God and Ulster, even if their initial attempts to be the counter-terror force the UVF envisioned itself as left something to be desired:

The reality was that few of them had ever fired a shot in anger. As a consequence, it was usually personal grievances, mixed with hefty doses of alcohol, which played a key role in the decision to target specific individuals.

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Martin Doherty

That was in its early years of the mid-1960s. Three decades later and the UVF was reaping a body count to match their Republican foes. To take the month of May 1994 alone: 76-year-old Rose Mallon, murdered at a relative’s home near Dungannon on the 8th; nine days later, the fatal shooting of 42-year-old Eamon Fox and 24-year-old Gary Convie by the East Antrim Brigade, and then, the next day, the Mid-Ulster Brigade attacking a taxi depot in Lurgan, resulting in the deaths of two 17-year-olds, Gavin McShane and Shane McArdle. Terrorism was not limited to the Six Counties, as shown when shots were fired at a Dublin pub, killing 35-year-old Martin Doherty. As an IRA member, Doherty was the type of target the UVF had been formed against, but it is hard to see the net gain of a dead elderly woman and teenagers. For all the UVF talk of ‘daring raids’ and ‘taking the war to the enemy’, the unvarnished reality was more often than not the spraying of homes, workplaces and recreation centres by AK47 or VZ58 assault rifles, without mercy or warning.

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Rose Mallon

Much has been written about the UVF and Loyalism in general. What gives Edwards’ book an advantage is its post-Troubles publication, in 2017, allowing us to see what happens to a war machine once the war is done. When Billy Greer died in July 2006, the organisation he had helped lead for decades was at a crossroads and seemingly unsure which way to go. A charismatic and popular man, his standing was enough for a number of senior Loyalists to attend his funeral in Belfast, complete with a purple UVF flag draped over his coffin and a guard of honour as the pall-bearers. ‘Here Lies a Soldier’ read the epitaph on his grave, above a UVF badge etched in gold lettering.

Yet, by the time of his death, Greer had surrendered his authority, resigning command of the East Antrim Brigade over allegations that subordinates of his were dealing drugs. That he jumped before needing a push probably saved him from worse. Nonetheless, even disgraced, Greer left big shoes which his successor, Gary Haggarty, struggled to fill. Not helping was the scale of the challenge: converting an armed militia into a politically sensitive, civic-minded ‘old comrades association’, preferably with less punishment beatings than before.

Haggarty’s tenure came to an awkward end when his past as a police informant came to light. In his conveniently timed absence, the rest of the UVF sentenced him to death – so much for ‘old comrades association’ – but the authorities got to him first on charges of murder. With all other bridges burnt, Haggarty turned supergrass against his erstwhile colleagues in January 2010.

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Gary Haggarty

Do mishaps and missteps like these mean that the UVF is out for the count, to be relegated to the past as an unfortunate anachronism? Hardly, argues Edwards. The structures of the organisation at the time of his writing:

…are still in place and, despite the hard work of some genuinely progressive people, show little signs of withering away on their own. In fact, the most recent evidence suggests that a ‘Praetorian Guard’ has been formed to maintain the old adage of a ‘pike in the thatch’. One only hopes that the record provided in this book will highlight the wrong turn by loyalists in the past, before more young people ruin their lives by travelling the futile road of paramilitary violence.

One hopes, indeed.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

See also: Book Review: My Life in Loyalism, by Billy Hutchinson (with Gareth Mulvenna) (2020)

Book Review: My Life in Loyalism, by Billy Hutchinson (with Gareth Mulvenna) (2020)

Loyalism_Book CoverLike many a young man in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, Billy Hutchinson began his political journey as a rioter in his home city of Belfast, slugging it out with missiles and makeshift barricades against the teargas and batons of the authorities. The highlight of Hutchinson’s street-fighting exploits was during the assault on ‘Fort Milanda’, an old Milanda bakery building on Snugville Street where the King’s Own Royal Regiment had set up base, right in the heart of a community with which it was increasingly at odds.

Such feelings were vented on the last week of September 1970, when hundreds of local residents, mostly youths, surrounded ‘Fort Milanda’, hurling anything at hand and eventually using a large post to ram down the gates. Espying a chance to make a name for himself, as well as express what he thought of the whole situation in his homeland, Hutchinson clambered up a drainpipe and snatched the regimental flag of the King’s Own from where it fluttered.

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British soldiers engaged in constructive dialogue on the streets of Northern Ireland

With the enemy’s disgrace complete, Hutchinson climbed back down to the cheers of his onlookers but, for him, the battle had been for more than its own sake:

It might be called ‘recreational rioting’ nowadays, but in 1970 we saw ourselves as street soldiers of a kind. This wasn’t just thuggery or troublemaking. We were defenders of the community.

He was 14 years-old; on the surface, just another young man in Doc Marten boots and a Wrangler jacket like many others in the UK but coming of age in a very different part of it. Resistance brought the respect of his peers and elders but also the less impressed attention of the British state, which harassed, arrested and eventually imprisoned him. All of which would make him a worthy subject of a Christy Moore song – except the Shankhill born-and-bred Hutchinson was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), fighting to keep Northern Ireland British.

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Hutchinson is not oblivious to the contradiction of his actions: “People might wonder why we, as Loyalists, were attacking the army of a state we professed an allegiance to.” If his reader is thinking ‘good question’, then “the answer is simple: The army was being heavy-handed with young men on Shankhill, and we saw them as an obstacle to getting our hands on the republicans while the authorities dithered.”

The definition of ‘republican’ could be open for debate. The double murder of Michael Loughran and Edward Morgan in October 1974 was due to the pair being identified by Loyalist intelligence “as active republicans. How accurate the information was, I don’t know.” Hutchinson is rather coy about his own activity, describing in his book little more than how the “evidence was clearly pointing toward my involvement in the shooting” when the police brought him in for questioning.  Notably, he refers to the two deaths as assassinations, suggesting that, whatever the rights and wrongs, truth or untruth, of five decades past, he remains untroubled by the deed.

Loyalism_victimsThe criminal justice system was not quite so sanguine, sentencing Hutchinson to prison and there he stayed for the next sixteen years until his release in 1990. In a sign of how the times were a-changing, Hutchinson worked, as director of the Springfield Inter-Community Development Project, alongside Tommy Gorman, a fellow ex-prisoner, except for the other side – not that it stopped the UVF officer and Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) member from striking up a bond, as well as a mode of operation, each running programmes in their different communities, and then meeting up to compare notes.

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Ian Paisley

The two had something else in common: both had grown sceptical of the people who previously held all the answers. Hutchinson witnessed Gorman openly needling Gerry Adams, telling him that if achieving a United Ireland was simply a case of Nationalists outbreeding Unionists, like Adams was proposing, then why did Gorman have to spend so much time in jail? As for Hutchinson, he had the last word with Ian Paisley when the preacher refused to enter a lift with “a UVF murderer.”

Hutchinson retorted that such niceties did not bother Paisley when he was urging others to their deaths:

As the doors to the lift slowly closed, Paisley’s face dropped and for once he was speechless – here was a man who had led the loyalist people to heartache and death, and still, thirty years later, he hadn’t changed his tune. He was a total hypocrite.

His dealings with David Trimble went better, if only because their two Unionists parties needed each other in the Peace Process to which both were committed. Otherwise, Trimble dismissed his fellow Shankhill native for lack of formal education. “It didn’t annoy me,” Hutchinson claims:

It was pure ignorance. It was just a ploy to make people think that they had to vote for doctors and lawyers, like they had always done.

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David Trimble

This relationship of a mutual goal running parallel with general contempt reflected the wider one between white-collar Unionists and their roughneck cousins. The former needs the latter for votes on election day, before abandoning them to the ghettos the next, leaving the working-class, as Hutchinson describes, “like a dog that is kicked by its owner and keeps coming back to get fed.” It’s this sort of insight that stands Hutchinson out from the other poster boys of Loyalism, the musclebound Johnny Adair and viperish Billy Wright, both of whom Hutchinson knew, and neither of which he could stand.

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Tommy Gorman

A curious note, then, that while Hutchinson joined the UVF to protect Northern Ireland from the horrors of Fenianism, on the few occasions Irish Republicans appear in his narrative, he seems to get on reasonably well with them. With people sharing the same Unionist cause, however, it’s just one thing after another. One wonders if the likes of Gorman could tell a similar story: his sparring with Adams ended with Gorman self-exiled to Donegal to escape the harassment of his former allies, who had driven him to distraction with fire engines and food takeaways falsely sent to his door.

Hutchinson’s internecine issues were less childish and potentially more deadly, such as when the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) threw a pipe-bomb at Hutchinson’s house in 2000. As the windows were of reinforced glass – in addition to the steel doors, security cameras and alarms – the weapon bounced off harmlessly. UVF and UDA combatants bombed or shot up offices connected to the other, while family members were considered fair game, even if shared across the divide. “One guy who was in the UDA, and whose brothers were in the UVF, put his own mother out of the Shankhill” as part of the “purge against UVF-linked families.” A kicked dog can still bite, particularly, it seems, other dogs.

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Johnny Adair, the UDA commander and constant thorn in Hutchinson’s side

Hutchinson was by then a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), but even an elected representative could not ignore the street law of the Shankhill. “Sometimes you face intracommunal issues that can’t be solved in the parliamentary chamber,” as he puts it. Hutchinson had demonstrated the implacable truth of that as far back as 1972, when he pulled out a gun at a UVF gathering to rebut a proposal not to his liking. The matter was dropped.

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Ken Gibson

Another UVF rival of Hutchinson’s at the time, Ken Gibson, stood as a candidate in West Belfast during the 1974 UK General Election, hoping to take working-class Unionism in the same political direction that Hutchinson would espouse decades later. Hutchinson does not spare Gibson the humiliation of informing his readers of how bad a drubbing the would-be politico got: 0.4% of the vote. Gibson would later condemn the Unionist politicians of 1974 – the ones who actually succeeded in being elected – as ‘back-stabbers’, an incongruity that gave Hutchinson a dry chuckle when he read it in the newspaper. He prided himself on hearing “the mood music, while Ken Gibson was trying to play an unpopular tune.”

But tunes can be changed, as Hutchinson and even the “total hypocrite” Paisley would do when the latter stood alongside Martin McGuinness as the First and Deputy First Ministers of a new Northern Ireland – or maybe an old Northern Ireland in new clothes. The difference, then, between a warmonger and peacemaker is perhaps as simple as a single thing:

Timing.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

Originally published in The Irish Story (07/09/2021)

Book Review: Dachau to Dolomites: The Irishmen, Himmler’s Special Prisoners and the End of WWII, by Tom Wall (2019)

Dachau_Book_CoverIf, in popular culture, the POW experience from World War II is the movie The Great Escape, then this book could be considered its antithesis. Instead of the daring-do of an irrepressible Steve McQueen as he clears a barbed-wire fence on a motorbike, we have here men and women doing their best simply to endure. Not all succeeded, and the fate of Yakov Dzhugashvili – the captured son of Joseph Stalin – was a case in point about how a sentry’s bullet did not play favourites:

He put one leg through the trip-wire, crossed over the neutral zone and put one foot into the barbed wire entanglement. At the same time he grabbed an insular with his left hand. Then he got out of it and grabbed the electrified fence. He stood for a moment with his right leg back and his chest puffed out and shouted at me ‘Guard, don’t be a coward, shoot me!’

The German guard in question duly did so. “A shot rang out, followed by a blinding flash, and poor Jakob [sic] hung there, his body horribly burnt and twisted,” recalled another witness, ‘Sergeant’ Thomas Cushing. He left out the small detail that the luckless man had been outside their shared hut in the first place because he, Cushing, chased him with a knife after a brawl broke out between the Russian and Irish prisoners.

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Yakov Dzhugashvili

But then, Cushing was a slippery individual. German military intelligence in the form of the Abwehr was interested in the recruitment potential of Irish-born POWs from the British Army, and Cushing was among those receptive to what his captors had to offer – or, at least, was willing to let them think so.

One could never quite tell with someone like Cushing, who claimed membership in the IRA during the Irish War of Independence (when he would have been ten), fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War (doubtful) and claimed the rank of sergeant while in Friesack Camp (he wasn’t). A chaplain at Friesack probably had the measure of the man when he described Cushing as someone who would “do and say anything to get out of prison.”

An equally crafty – though perhaps more admirable – Irishman in the camp was Colonel John McGrath, who also volunteered his services. In his case, he did so to undermine the German operations from within. When opportunity came in the form of a visiting priest (and a fellow son of Erin), Father Thomas O’Shaughnessy, McGrath had a list of the names of other inmates being trained by the Abwehr for sabotage missions smuggled out on the person of the padre at, as it turned out, no small cost to himself.

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John McGrath (Irish Times, 29th November 1946, thanks to Come Here to Me!)

The subtitle here is somewhat misleading, as Irishmen like McGrath and Cushing are merely one of the many nationalities present in this book who found themselves at the mercy of the Third Reich, though McGrath fits the role of central character best of all; appropriately enough, given that it was the sighting of his name, in an unexpected place, which inspired historian Tom Wall:

At the entrance to the exhibition in the Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site, there is a large wall map listing the names of prisoners from each country held in that notorious place. A figure of ‘1’ is superimposed on a map of Ireland. On a visit, intrigued by who this fellow Irishman might be, I began a journey of discovery. I soon learned he was John McGrath, from Elphin in Country Roscommon.

McGrath’s undercover work came with painful consequences. The Abwehr caught wind of his leakage, not through Father O’Shaughnessy – who was as good as his word in taking the information brief, first to London and then to the Irish Government – but when a coded message to Dublin was broken.

After some “intensified interrogation”, with the threat of execution as a spy, McGrath spent ten months in solitary confinement before being transferred to Dachau, where he became part of a group of around 160 prisoners, representing 18 European countries – the Prominenten – gathered for use as bargaining chips by high-ranking Nazis desperate to save their own skins as the war turned against them.

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Entrance to Dachua Concentration Camp

While this gave the Prominenten value, one of them, the former French statesman, Léon Blum, was all too aware of the perilous situation this status put them in, as he noted in his diary:

When you say: ‘I offer to exchange Mr. so and so, who is in my hands, for this other,’ it necessarily means: ‘if you refuse to bargain, I will do away with Mr. so and so.’

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Adolf Hitler

Blum had good reason to worry; in post-War trials of high-ranking Nazis, plans for Operation Volkenbrand – Fire Cloud – emerged, where the Luftwaffe was to bomb Dachau out of existence. Alternatively, its residents could be shot or poisoned. “Shoot them all! Shoot them all!” Hitler ranted during a conversation in his bunker where the Prominenten were among the topics, though it was debatable as to which of his many enemies the unhinged Fuhrer was referring to.

Finally, it was decided by the authorities to evacuate Dachau. The Prominenten at least left by bus, a relative luxury compared to how the ordinary prisoners were forced to march on foot, a sign of the importance that the German high command placed on them. A good character reference on a witness stand after the War could make all the difference in a war crimes court, after all.

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Prisoners being marched out of Dachau

Even then, there was no guarantee of survival for the hostages as they were taken southwards, their intended destination being the Alpine fortress where the regime was expected to make its last stand. Their SS guards might keep them alive – or just as easily kill them to avoid any inconvenient finger-pointing later. One German assured a British POW, with whom he had become friendly, if not quite friends, that he would give him, if needs be, a clean end, via Nackenschuss – a pistol shot to the back of the head – of which he was an expert.

It was intended as a favour. Perhaps it was. It was hard to be sure in a nightmarishly uncertain world, where clear concepts held less and less meaning. Even ‘captor’ and ‘captive’ were becoming blurred, as it was suggested to the former that they relinquish command to the latter. This was while an attack by anti-Nazi partisans was being planned with the knowledge of some of the prisoners, and to the alarm of the others who feared being caught in the crossfire just when the end of the fighting was in sight.

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SS officers

Despite the setting, this is less of a war book and more of a study of human nature. Considering the range of personalities and situations, it can be a difficult work to take in at one go and rereads might be needed to fully grasp some of the nuances. Everything, from the inner workings of Reich politics to the ethnic tensions between Germans and Italians in South Tyrol – where the Prominenten and their escorts ended up – is grist to the mill here, but especially the different ways individuals, whether heroes, villains and everything in between, will respond when pushed to extremes.

Some just give up, such as poor Dzhugashvili. Others rise to the occasion as best they can, like McGrath. But liberty for those who survived brought challenges of a different, more insidious sort. McGrath returned to his former managerial job in the Theatre Royal in Dublin but soon resigned due to nerves unhealed from his time as a prisoner. When he died, just seventeen months after his homecoming, it was Father O’Shaughnessy, appropriately enough, who delivered the last rites. Those wanting a Second World War book of a different sort, stripped of the usual heroics, would be well recommended to try this one.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

Originally published in The Irish Story (10/06/2019)

Book Review: Richard Mulcahy: From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924, by Pádraig Ó Caoimh (2019)

9781788550987Life was not easy for Richard Mulcahy. As Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), he had endured months as a fugitive from the British authorities, hunted amidst the streets of Dublin and at grave peril to his wellbeing. With the Truce in July 1921 drawing the war to a pause, Mulcahy could have expected some peace of his own. Instead, no sooner had one conflict ended did another intensify, except this was with someone he should have called a comrade: Cathal Brugha, the iron-willed, not to say highly-strung, Minister for Defence in the underground government that they both belonged to.

A shared cause did nothing to assuage tensions between the two leaders, as the latest flashpoint in their simmering row erupted over typewriters, of all things: the owner of a company specialising in their manufacture had had a number stolen from his Dublin office by the IRA. He fired his secretary in the belief that she had been the inside woman for the robbery, and was consequently warned to leave the country.

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Cathal Brugha

It was a half-silly, half-squalid affair but, with peace established, the exiled businessman applied for permission to return home. Mulcahy forwarded the request to Michael Collins, unwittingly turning a simple matter into a complicated one when Brugha, for reasons of his own, decided that Collins had erred in his assignment, and contacted Mulcahy to that effect, much to the other man’s displeasure.

“I consider the tone of your letter…is very unfortunate,” Mulcahy wrote back icily, which only enraged Brugha further in his own reply:

Before you are very much older, my friend, I shall show you that I have…little intention of taking dictation from you as to how I should reprove inefficiency or negligence on the part of yourself or the D/I [Director of Intelligence, Collins].

Mulcahy proceeded passively-aggressively by refusing to attend further staff sessions, earning his suspension by Brugha. Mulcahy was thenceforth to surrender all documents, books and other material connected to his duties. Luckily, a higher authority stepped in before things escalated any further: Éamon de Valera stood by as Brugha tearfully apologised, or at least close enough for Mulcahy to accept.

It was all rather undignified. De Valera had played peacemaker, but he also contributed his own share of drama. “Ye may mutiny if ye like, but Ireland will give me another army,” he hotly proclaimed in a gathering of the GHQ Staff when truculence towards his proposed reforms wore down his last nerve.

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Éamon de Valera

The Irish Plenipotentiaries had just departed for talks in London in October 1921 and, since a failure to strike a deal would probably result in renewed war, it was important to have the IRA so prepared; in de Valera’s view, this meant ensuring that the military relationship with the civilian government, which he headed, was a clearly defined subordinate one. Considering how they had been bearing the brunt of the Anglo-Irish struggle, Mulcahy and his colleagues took this implied lack of faith in their loyalty rather personally, as they did de Valera’s outburst.

“I didn’t think that there was a man in Ireland that would speak like that [to Mulcahy]”, said a white-faced Seán Russell after the contentious meeting.

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Mary MacSwiney

Given the esteem Mulcahy was held in revolutionary circles, it came as a surprise, even a shock, when he threw in his support for the Treaty. “Dick wouldn’t do such a thing,” Mary MacSwiney insisted when she first heard, while Pax Ó Faoláin could not comprehend “how a great Irish-Irelander like Richard Mulcahy could accept a treaty that gave away six of our counties and that allowed the exercise of only limited sovereignty over the other twenty-six.”

While others were at a loss to understand, de Valera knew where to point the finger – the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and its lobbying behind the scenes:

MC [Michael Collins] had got the IRB machine working. The Dail members of the IRB were told that acceptance of the Treaty would be the quickest way to the Republic and a lot of other stuff which time alone will explode.

Or to put it more succinctly: “Curse secret societies.”

Two themes dominated Mulcahy’s career as a soldier, at least how historian Pádraig Ó Caoimh presents it: fraught relationships with civic authorities and his IRB membership, both of which continued in the Free State, to Mulcahy’s ultimate detriment.

He had only himself to blame. When allegations surfaced of an IRB presence in the upper echelons of the Free State military in April 1923, Mulcahy not only confirmed but defended this fact, praising the Brotherhood as:

…a machine that, in the first place, has pulled the country through the very difficult situation it got into, and which, in the second place, will be the home for the development of all those particular characteristics which will go to make an Irish character we may be proud of.

A ‘machine’ – both de Valera and Mulcahy referred to the Brotherhood as such but, while the former said it as an accusation, to the latter that meant opportunities to be wrought. After all, what was the spirit of the IRB but that of Patrick Pearse, Tom Clarke and other names so revered?

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Free State soldiers on parade

With that in mind, the IRB Constitution was rewritten to accommodate initiates within the Free State forces. While de Valera had identified Collins as the prime mover behind the fraternity, now it was Mulcahy taking the lead, meeting with his fellow government minister, Kevin O’Higgins, on how best to frame the new order. Going by the minutes of their conversation, O’Higgins, while not opposed per se to the IRB, had reservations about its long-term effects, something Mulcahy refused to even considering as a possibility:

O’Higgins: Urged the very great danger of persons being put into pivotal positions, purely because of belonging to certain organisations; that it would lead to serious abuses, and serious weaknesses.

Mulcahy: That it would never happen and that it was absurd to think that it ever would.

O’Higgins: Put it up that certain pivotal people at the present moment were only there because they were of the Organisation (IRB).

Mulcahy: Who else could be in their places?

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Kevin O’Higgins

O’Higgins had other concerns. If the IRB looked poised to be a separate power in the Free State, then the Army already was a law unto itself, particularly in Kerry, where the bitterness of civil war was starkly demonstrated in a string of ugly incidents. As the military authority, Paddy O’Daly, had the most to answer, yet Mulcahy defended him every step of the way.

“In the case of any Officer who has given distinguished service of lasting benefit to his Country,” Mulcahy replied when questioned, “I was not prepared lightly, and on no evidence, to place him in the degrading position of answering to a low charge.”

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Paddy O’Daly

Murdering POWs by tying them to landmines or dragging women out of their homes for a lashing was apparently what amounted to a ‘low charge’ in Mulcahy’s esteem. O’Daly had been one of his few reliable soldiers during the Civil War, and Mulcahy was clearly not one to forget loyal service, but public priorities had changed by the time of the Army Inquiry in March 1923, and his decision to stand by his subordinates was now seen as embarrassingly indulgent, if not alarmingly immoral.

Perhaps if Mulcahy had had a more congenial relationship with his civilian colleagues, he might have emerged from the inquiry with his standing intact. But he had grown too used to marching to the beat of his own drum without a thought for the rest of the band.

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Ernest Blythe

Earlier, in the midst of the Civil War in September 1922, he had taken the liberty of covertly meeting with de Valera in the hope of a peaceful solution. A worthy effort, perhaps, if unsuccessful, but that liberty was not his to take. The Cabinet had already ruled that anything short of unconditional surrender on the part of the Anti-Treatyites was unacceptable. Mulcahy had in effect gone behind their collective backs, leading to an excruciatingly awkward session when he confessed, as Ernest Blythe described:

When he had finished there was a dead silence for what seemed like minutes. All of us realised that the only thing that it was proper to say was that General Mulcahy must hand in his resignation. In view of the state of affairs generally, and in view of the way in which the Government was cut off from the Army, none of us felt that we could make that demand.

When the silence had lasted so long that the Cabinet meeting seemed on the point of becoming rather like a Quaker prayer meeting, Mr. Cosgrave said. “That’s all,” got up and left his chair, and all of us left the room without a single comment on General Mulcahy’s disclosure.

Mulcahy at least kept his rank – for the moment. Irony abounded: he had risked all in parlaying with an enemy he had had little time for even when allies. Where de Valera failed in bringing the headstrong general to heel, the Army Inquiry succeeded with a housecleaning of the military high command. Mulcahy was among those forced to resign, a humiliating slap in the face for a man who had just succeeded in two back-to-back wars.

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Richard Mulcahy

Retracing such a journey has clearly been a labour of love for Ó Caoimh, whose bibliography is an exhaustive list of archival memorandum, personal reminisces and subsequent historiography, allowing us an unrivalled peak into Mulcahy’s thoughts. Note ‘thoughts’, not ‘feelings’, which are scant: the subject might as well be carved from a block of wood for all the emotion on display, save for the occasional slip of annoyance at whichever politico was trying to boss him around.

“Socially distant, politically complex and militarily circumspect” is how Mulcahy, while in his mid-thirties, is summed up. One senses this is a biography that introverted man would have approved of: long on the public, short on personal, with details of his private life reserved for the footnotes. State-building requires focus, after all, and Ó Caoimh’s work goes a long way in reminding us of the central role Mulcahy played in the Irish one’s formative years. Readers beware, however, of the sickly stink of suspicion wafting from almost every page.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

See also: Career Conspirators: The (Mis)Adventures of Seán Ó Muirthile and the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the Free State Army, 1923-4

Book Review: The Irish Civil War: Law, Execution and Atrocity, by Seán Enright (2019)

9781785372537_fc-brightenedIs it better to be feared or loved, asked the wise Italian. Both are nice but, if one had to choose, fear should be prized over love, for men are fickle in their affections, while everyone thinks twice when the consequences are sufficiently dire. Machiavelli may have passed a harsh judgement on human nature, but the dilemma he presented was one the nascent Free State was forced to confront upon the shootings of Séan Hales and Pádraic Ó Máille on the 7th December 1922, resulting in the death of the former and the wounding of the latter.

Both were TDs in the Dáil, with Ó Máille being no less its Deputy Speaker, and yet their ambush had been committed in broad daylight on a public street as part of a “carefully laid plan to annihilate this government,” announced Eoin MacNeill to the Dáil. It was a strong statement but, then, the Executive Council of the government in question, to which MacNeill belonged, was in a defensive mood, having just ordered the deaths of four imprisoned men in response.

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The Executive Council of the Provisional Government, October 1922, presided over by W.T. Cosgrave (seated at the head of the table)

Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows, Joe McKelvey and Dick Barrett had been woken in their cells, briskly informed of their impending sentence and then taken out into the yard of Mountjoy Prison where a firing-squad did the rest. All four had been part of an armed campaign against the Free State but, while war is hell, “from a legal perspective,” writes historian Séan Enright:

…these men were executed without trial for acts committed by others…The new state was barely two days old and the Constitution guaranteed life, liberty, freedom of conscience and due process or at least trial by military court.

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Kevin O’Higgins

Such requirements the Executive Council had manifestly failed to uphold. Nonetheless, the reprisals had their desired result. Save for a couple of ineffectual pot-shots, there were no further assassination attempts on TDs of the Free State. “Is there no alternative?” Kevin O’Higgins had asked when the Council met to sign off on the executions. ‘No’ had been the answer.

Still, these four executions were the exception, not the rule, for the Free State was generally careful in ensuring that its death penalties fitted within the framework of the law. Which law, however, was a tricky question in itself.

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Count Plunkett

Until the Irish Free State came officially into being on the 6th December 1922, the Provisional Government was obliged to rely on British legislation to fill the legal gap – except when that would be inconvenient, such as Count Plunkett bringing forward a claim of habeas corpus on behalf of his son, who was one of the anti-Treaty prisoners taken at the Four Courts in July 1922.

Judge Diarmuid Crowley deemed it satisfactory and issued a writ which threatened to set a precedence for every POW to be set free. Instead, Crowley found himself arrested and detained at Wellington Barracks, in a cell next to one where another prisoner was being subjected to, ahem, ‘enhanced interrogation’.

This was not the end of habeas corpus as a legal recourse: solicitors for Erskine Childers attempted it in a bid to avert his imminent execution, but Sir Charles O’Connor, as Master of the Rolls, simply brushed it aside on the grounds of the common good. “Suprema lex, salus populi must be the guiding principle when the civil law has failed,” Sir Charles ruled:

Force then becomes the only remedy, and to those whom the task is committed must be the sole judge of how it should be exercised…the salvation of the country depends upon it.

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Erskine Childers

Childers had no one to blame but himself, Sir Charles continued, with his recourse to civil law being hypocritical given how such “jurisdiction is ousted by the state of war which he himself has helped to procure.” Sir Charles did not speak lightly; after all, the hearing was being held in the King’s Inns because the usual site of the Four Courts lay in ruins thanks to the war in question.

Ironically, Sir Charles had defeated an earlier regime by use of habeas corpus when, shortly after the Truce of 1921, he issued such a writ on behalf of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoner due to be shot under British martial law. When this was refused, Sir Charles went further and issued another writ, this time for the arrest of the army generals accountable.

The military gave way and released the prisoner, a precedence that looked to unravel its counter-insurgency strategy should war resume. The Irish Provisional Government was clearly not going to risk the same thing happening on its watch, as Sir Charles shrewdly – if perhaps cynically – understood. He was an old legal face in a new system playing by new rules.

mulcahy046The Free State was thus cherry-picking which laws were opportune to apply while ignoring the rest. As always, cruel necessity was its defence. When presenting to the Dáil the case for establishing military courts with the power of life and death over POWs, Richard Mulcahy pointed to a couple of incidents where his soldiers had shot anti-Treaty captives out of hand.

Legalise, was his argument, for it is going to happen anyway in one form or another.

Much of this will be familiar to historians of the period, but Enright shines a torch on the legal aspects, making his readers see the topic in a new light: more than just another war but the struggle by one side to establish itself as the rule of law, by using the rule of law, even if it meant twisting the rules and discarding the law at will. How this will be addressed in the forthcoming centenary remains to be seen but, in any case, it was by these means that the Free State triumphed, albeit bloodily, not to say questionably as even the victors were aware.

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Firing-squad during the Civil War (most likely staged)

The challenges of researching the conflict, as Enright observes, includes the paucity of reliable sources, due in no small part to the burning of sensitive documents just before Fianna Fáil took office in 1932. Succeeding in the Civil War did not prevent its winners from being voted out almost a decade later in favour of the losers, one of the many ironies of the times and which Machiavelli might have appreciated. Men, after all, are fickle in their affections.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

See also: Book Review: After the Rising: Soldiers, Lawyers and Trials of the Irish Revolution, by Seán Enright (2016)

Book Review: The ‘Labour Hercules’: The Irish Citizen Army and Irish Republicanism, 1913-23, by Jeffrey Leddin (2019)

Labour_Hercules“If you or anybody else expect that I’m going to waste my time talking ‘bosh’ to the crowds,” James Connolly was heard to say, “for the sake of hearing shouts, you’ll be sadly disappointed.” He preferred instead to “give my message to four serious men at any crossroads in Ireland and know that they carry it back to the places they came from.”

This would prove to be more than just ‘bosh’ on Connolly’s part. A stiffening of the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) was noted in October 1914, upon his assumption of its leadership, with the announcement of a mandatory parade for all members. Rifles were to be “thoroughly cleaned”, anyone absent would be noted and latecomers refused admittance.

Meanwhile, articles by Connolly started to appear in the Workers’ Republic, critiquing the tactics deployed by past uprisings, such as Paris in 1848 and its use of barricades in an urban environment a particular point of interest. “The general principle to be deducted from a study of the example we have been dealing with,” Connolly wrote in July 1915:

…is that the defence is of almost overwhelming importance in such warfare as a popular force like the Citizen Amy might be called upon to participate in. Not a mere passive defence of a position valueless in itself, but the active defence of a position whose location threatens the supremacy or the existence of the enemy.

Less than a year later, in April 1916, these lessons would be applied in Moore Street and the Royal College of Surgeons as part of the Easter Rising in Dublin.

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ICA members overlooking the streets of Dublin

It had been an event long in gestation. It was also quite a departure from the starting goal of the ICA, when it was formed in response to the police brutality against strikers on the Bloody Sunday of 1913. Three months afterwards, in November, Jim Larkin publicly “spoke of the need for a disciplined force to protect the workers and signified his intention of forming a citizen army,” according to one of his audience.

There were, however, clues that more ambitious plans were afoot for the citizen army in question rather than self-defence. An article in the Irish Times had Connolly proclaim that the new body was “for victory, for the freedom of their country, and his and their grand ideal of a self-centred and a self-governing Ireland [as] a republic among the nations.” Even then, he had the big picture in mind.

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Jack White

In contrast, Jack White, the first Chairman of the ICA, had no such ambitions for any kind of upheaval, whether social or national. Despite his position of command within a paramilitary body, he was ambivalent about the use of force. “In moments I saw the clear revolutionary principle,” White wrote, “at others I was repelled by the bitterness of a philosophy fighting against the whole establishment order.”

The challenge of reconciling these competing strands of thought underpins much of the early chapters of the book. It is also indicative of Leddin’s style, which tends to be heavy on the political and less so on the personal. In any case, the withdrawal of Larkin and White from the scene, the former to America and the latter in favour of a position in the Irish Volunteers, left Connolly as the sole guiding hand of the ICA. Ireland in general was undergoing a radicalisation, with the forming of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to resist Home Rule, and Connolly looked forward to the time when the ICA could put the recalcitrant Ulstermen in their place.

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James Connolly

“When King [Edward] Carson comes along here we will be able to line our own ditches,” he boasted on the day of the ICA’s birth. This is not to say, Leddin writes, “that Connolly was contemplating the events of Easter 1916 but that the possibility of using the Citizen Army as a national weapon had already occurred to him.”

As far as Connolly was concerned, it was not a case of ‘if’ but ‘when’ the ICA would become involved in the wider struggle. Others appreciated the sentiment: Patrick Pearse greeted the transport union men, marked out by their red hand badges, at the Bodenstown Wolfe Tone commemoration in June 1913, telling those present that there were “no strangers here.”

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Laurence Kettle

From here, Leddin focuses on the growing rapport between the ICA and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), the sort of ‘serious men at any crossroads’ who Connolly had in mind, and who shared his impatience for an armed uprising against the status quo. There were bumps on the road, however: the presence of Laurence Kettle as Secretary at the forming of the Irish Volunteers in November 1913 was met with heckles from Labour men who objected to the presence of a known strike-breaker on the Provisional Committee.

The leadership of the Irish Volunteers as it stood was too broad in its demographics to be naturally inclined to revolution. The IRB consisted of only eleven members of the thirty-strong Committee, with the rest, if they were political at all, being from constitutionally or conservatively-minded groups like the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The indifference of the IPP towards the Lockout of 1913 meant that many in Labour regarded the Parliamentary Party as just as another enemy in the class war.

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Tom Clarke

Labour did not play much better with others. “Larkin’s people for some time past have been making war on the Irish Volunteers,” complained Tom Clarke in a letter in May 1914, “they have antagonised the sympathy of all sections of the country and none more so than the advanced section.” He concluded with: “Liberty Hall is now a negligible quality.”

What a change, then, on the Easter Monday of the 24th April 1916, when Connolly and Pearse marched together at the heads of their respective armies from Liberty Hall, along Eden Quay and down Sackville (now O’Connell) Street, to take up headquarters in the General Post Office and thus begin the Rising that the latter had long contemplated – and now had the chance to put his research to the test.

It was the start of six days that would shake an empire but, even at that climaxing moment, there were uncertainties as to where the ICA exactly stood in regard to its comrades-in-arms. “You are going out to fight, not as the Irish Citizen Army, but as soldiers of the Irish Republic,” Connolly told his followers on the eve of battle.

It was a nice idea, one which others agreed with. “The Citizen Army ceased to exist on Monday of Easter Week,” recalled one participant, while for another: “When the joint forces were brought together on Easter Sunday there was no distinction between the Volunteers and the Citizen Army.”

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ICA members

Not all subscribed to this theory of neat and tidy assimilation, however. “While they [the ICA] may have shelved their identity, they never really lost it,” insisted another witness. Even Connolly appeared to have had suspicions, or at least reservations, about the extent of the alliance, as he advised his subordinates – in the same breath that he extolled them to fight alongside the Volunteers – to keep a hand on their guns, lest today’s friends become tomorrow’s foes.

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Michael Mallin

Not that we will ever know what would have resulted in the event of a rebel win, though Leddin does not consider the likelihood of such a civil war as very likely. But it is also true that the ICA and the Volunteers, for all their ideological overlap, came together – to steal a later quote from Henry Kissinger – like porcupines making love: carefully. When Connolly went missing on the 19th January 1916, Michael Mallin, Countess Markievicz and William O’Brien, as the de facto troika for the ICA in their leader’s absence, prepared to kick-start their insurrection in Dublin early, with or without anyone else.

Only a request from the IRB, and then Connolly’s reappearance three days later on the 22nd, stayed their hand. Whether he had been brought willingly to the IRB meeting – the one where he was inducted into its military council and thus became privy to its plans – or was kidnaped is a matter of some debate, but it is noteworthy that the rest of the ICA initially assumed the worst.

Post-Rising, the ICA found itself on the sidelines as the Irish Volunteers, later the Irish Republican Army (IRA), dominated the subsequent struggle. Despite a short-lived attempt to expand into Cork, the ICA was always limited to Dublin and so could never match the breadth of the other force.

Though Labour provided assistance during the War of Independence and then the Civil War, and relations with the IRA remained amicable, “none of the ICA’s skirmishes were significant to the wider republican struggle,” writes Leddin. Easter Week was thus the only time the Army of Labour approached the status of a Hercules, after which it shrank to a pygmy’s.

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The Starry Plough

Still, its example lived on. The Starry Plough that the ICA had borne on its flag became part of the iconography painted on Nationalist murals, alongside the Easter lily and phoenix, during the Troubles and afterwards. Indeed:

An Institute of Irish Studies survey on the display of public emblems in Northern Ireland found that in the months of September and October, from 2006 to 2009, the starry plough was the most likely republican or unionist paramilitary symbol to be on display in Northern Ireland.

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Paul Murphy

Today’s political groups prove as eager as armed ones to claim the mantle. For Labour leader Joan Burton, a granddaughter of an ICA member, Connolly’s “core vision was one of equality” which just happened to be “a vision the Labour Party had sought to fulfil from its foundation.” In contrast, Gerry Adams emphasised on behalf of Sinn Féin the anti-Imperial and anti-Partition stances of the 1916 leaders while, to Paul Murphy of the Anti-Austerity Alliance, Connolly’s importance lay in his internationalist, rather than merely nationalist, viewpoint.

If the Irish Citizen Army, then, is a question with multiple, competing answers, then this book should provide readers with plenty of material to help make up their own minds.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

Originally published on The Irish Story (26/08/2019)

Book Review: Markievicz: Prison Letters & Rebel Writings, by Constance Markievicz (edited by Lindie Naughton) (2018)

Markievicz_cover“It is awfully funny being ‘on the run’!” wrote Countess Markievicz to her sister Eva, in January 1920. “I don’t know what I resemble most: the timid hare, the wily fox, or a fierce wild animal of the jungle.” For three months, she had been a free woman since leaving Cork Jail, on the 18th October 1919, in time for a police constable to be shot dead in Dublin later that evening.

The British authorities claimed a connection between that and her release; in any case, the situation was sufficiently unsettled in Ireland for a state crackdown on the burgeoning Republican movement, with house raids, arrests and, for some, deportations, hence the necessity of Markievicz staying one step ahead of the foreign foe.

Not that she appeared terribly concerned, at least in another letter to Eva: “I go about a lot, one way or another, and every house is open to me and everyone is ready to help.” When she felt like stretching her legs, she took a bicycle around Dublin, the startled expressions of policemen at the sight of a notorious rebel as she whizzed by amusing her considerably.

“There are very few women on bikes in the winter, so a hunted beast on a bike is very remarkable,” she pointed out.

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Countess Markievicz, posing in uniform with a pistol

But then, Markievicz was far from an ordinary individual. With a flourish, she signed the letter with the initials ‘I.C.A, T.D.’ after her name, the first set from her time in the Irish Citizen Army, which she had helped lead during the 1916 Rising, and the other due to her Dáil Éireann seat. Whatever her commitments, she took them seriously. When municipal local elections were held in January 1920, Markievicz publicly spoke on behalf of several female candidates in Dublin, despite her outlaw status and the threat of capture. At one such rally, as she related:

I wildly and blindly charged through a squad of armed police, sent there to arrest me, and the crowds swallowed me up and got me away. The children did the trick for me.

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Seán MacBride

But luck and pluck could only take her so far, and she was finally caught in September 1920, while driving back with Seán MacBride from a trip to the Dublin mountains. After all the close shaves, it was an absurdly minor oversight that undid her:

The police pulled us up because of the tail lamp not being there: they asked for a permit; [MacBride] had none, so they got suspicious and finally lit a match in my face and phoned for the military.

Confinement to Mountjoy did little to stem the flow of her correspondence. It was not all business; Markievicz thanked her sister for the fruit sent to her in prison. Eva was holidaying in Florence, and Markievicz was eager to hear the details. “You’ll be glad to hear that I am not on hunger strike at present,” she added near the end, almost as an afterthought.

To read her words is to be yanked back into the cut and thrust of Irish politics and war at a time when a thin line, at best, existed between the two. Despite the hardships, Markievicz thrived, and her letters show a remarkable range of interests, from cosy family chitchat to the finer points of literature. But a hunger for current affairs was never far from the surface, whether Ireland’s or elsewhere; Russia, for instance, pricked her notice. “I haven’t given up on the Bolshies yet,” she wrote. “I believe that they will greatly improve conditions for the world.”

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Markievicz speaking at a rally

On that particular point, the two siblings were not entirely in accord, though Markievicz sought to mollify the other somewhat: “I agree with you disliking the autocracy of any class, but surely if they have the sense to organise education, they can abolish class.” While she admitted the possibility of Communism becoming another tyranny, “it would be worth it in the long run. After all, as she blithely put it, “the French Revolution gave France new life, though all their fine ideas ended in horrors and bloodshed and wars. The world, too, gained.”

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Eva Gore-Boothe, Markievicz’s sister

Quite what the Bolsheviks would have made of the aristocratically-born Countess is another, unasked question. But then, Markievicz wasted little time worrying about what society thought. Her life was her own, and she lived it with scant regrets. In January 1924, barely a month out of her latest spell in prison – courtesy of her fellow countrymen this time – she explained to Eva her approach to the challenges in her life, such as the hunger strike she and the other Republican prisoners had just undertaken.

“I always rather dreaded a hunger strike,” she admitted:

But when I had to do it I found that, like most things, the worst of it was looking forward to the possibility of having to do it. I did not suffer at all but just stayed in bed and dozed and tried to prepare myself to leave the world.

The good news was that the prolonged starvation had alleviated her rheumatism. “Now, old darling, I must stop. Writing on a machine always tempts one to ramble on and on.”

Judging by the rest of her letters collected here, the typewriter was hardly the one to blame. Not that the reader, whether a learned historian or neophyte seeking to know more, is likely to mind. Few voices from the era were as loquacious or engaging as Countess Markievicz’s, as this book shows.

Publisher’s Website: Irish Academic Press

Originally published on The Irish Story (13/04/2019)